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Introduction
At the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s 26 countries in Eastern
Europe, the former Soviet Union and Mongolia initiated market reform policies. During
the 1980’s the average annual growth in real GDP for these countries was about 2.9%,
while for the period 1990-1997, the average growth rate was –5.7%.
1 During the same
period China was implementing a relatively slow and gradual policy of economic reform
and their economy responded with very high real GDP growth. From these experiences it
was commonly concluded that rapid economic reform led to (at least) a short-term
economic decline and that the more gradual implementation of reforms is more
appropriate for countries starting with a long legacy of central planning.
However, the above statistics and analysis ignore some interesting variations
among the 26 CEE/FSU/Mongolian economies. The reform experience within this
sample varies considerably from the rapid implementation observed in Slovenia and
Poland to the very slow reforms observed in Belarus and Ukraine. And the results have
varied as well. Average real annual GDP growth (1990/1997) for Slovenia was 1.4%, for
                                                
1 GDP growth rates are taken from the World Bank Development Reports for 1996 and 1997.
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Poland 4.1% while for Belarus it was –6.1% and for Ukraine it was –13.1%. The World
Bank has constructed indices of reform speed for these 26 transitioning economies and
the relation between reform speed and economic growth rates, as shown in the above
figure, is positive.
2 The conclusion drawn is that these countries all started with
unfavorable “starting positions”, were about to suffer economic decline even with no
change in economic policy, and those countries implementing more rapid market reforms
suffered from less of a decline. One could point to the economic declines in Cuba and
North Korea during this period as “control cases” of what would have happened if no
economic reforms had been implemented.
With respect to China, the aggregate statistics conceal interesting internal
variations. Within China there are large variations in economic outcomes, with the
southern coastal provinces and special economic zones experiencing rapid growth, while
some of the inland provinces are struggling with unemployment problems. If it is argued
that economic reform policies have been uniformly implemented within China, then the
inter-provincial variation in economic outcomes must derive from variations in their
starting positions. However, it should also be recognized that economic reforms have not
been uniformly implemented across China, and one can argue that the economic reforms
have been implemented more rapidly in those provinces which have experienced faster
economic growth.
To bring some order to the analysis of the reform experiences of different
countries it is useful to consider the relative impacts of “starting positions” versus
“reform speed” in determining economic outcomes. The debate in the economics
literature has polarized into two points of view.
3
One viewpoint is that faster reforms lead to better economic outcomes, but
because of unfavorable starting positions in some countries, the implementation of rapid
economic reforms has led to negative economic outcomes. Countries like China had
favorable starting positions and would have had even better economic outcomes had they
implemented economic reforms more rapidly. According to this view point, gradualist
reform strategies are realistically viewed as a hodgepodge of political compromises, are
largely the result of rent seeking activities, and create vested interests who will stand in
the way of needed reforms.
                                                
2 The index was constructed in the background paper, de Melo et. al. for the 1996 World Development
Report, From Plan to Market. For information on the construction of the Reform Speed index, see the data
appendix for this paper and de Melo et. al. appendix “The Liberalization Index and How it Was
Constructed”.
3 Here we borrow from Sachs and Woo who treat these two points of view extensively.
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The second point of view also maintains the need for market reforms but argues
that the reform experience is filled with problems of market failures stemming from
monopolization, asymmetric information, imperfect property right enforcement and slow
institutional development. Appropriate reform, according to this viewpoint is purposely
slow, experimental, and Bayesian. Policy makers need to engineer adjustments
midstream in response to problems as they appear. According to this view, the problems
observed in Russia are more a result of the too rapid implementation of reform than it is a
result of unfavorable starting positions.
So the debate boils down to the following question; what explains the variation in
economic outcomes in transitioning economies; reform speed or starting positions? Of
course the easy answer is that both reform speed and starting positions have significant
effects on economic outcomes. It is simply an econometric problem to estimate the
relative magnitudes of each effect. This paper will try to provide a clear framework for
estimating this relationship. First we will construct a simple game theoretic model which
is capable of providing a better description of what is meant by the term “starting
position”. The model suggests an addition to the usual argument concerning the relative
importance of reform speed and starting positions in that the model predicts that reform
speed is endogenously determined and is itself a function of starting positions. The paper
uses this framework as a guide to an empirical reexamination of the relationship between
reform speed, starting positions, and economic outcomes. Empirical results are then
presented and discussed.
A Heuristic Model
In this section we construct a simple model to examine the conditions affecting
the speed at which market reforms are implemented. The simple conclusion is that reform
speed will depend upon the country’s  ‘background conditions” at the beginning of the
reforms. But the existing discussion does not define which background conditions are
likely to matter nor does it predict the direction of their effects. The model developed
below lends some insight into what kinds of “background conditions” will lead to the
more rapid implementation of market reforms.
Consider a simple two period game with two agents. The first agent is the
incumbent decision-maker who must decide whether to implement market reforms and if
so, at which speed. Here we will represent the speed at which market reforms are
implemented by the variable z. For the moment, assume that the incumbent decision-
maker has the preferences of a “reformer”. The utility of the reformer is only a function
of the size of the economy (E), and the reformer thinks that more rapid economic reforms
will lead to more rapid economic growth. That is UR= UR [E(z)] with ∂ UR /∂ E > 0 and the
reformer’s expectation is that ∂ E/∂ z > 0. Thus reformers are called reformers because
they only care about economic growth and they think that more rapid market reforms will
lead to greater economic growth.
The second economic agent represents the reformists’ opposition. Like the
reformists, the opposition also likes economic growth, think that reform stimulates
growth, but dislikes the economic displacement that they think accompanies economic
reform. UO = UO[E(z), D(z,b)]. The function D(• ) is the oppositions’ estimate of the
degree to which reform will cause economic displacement, in the form of the closing and
downsizing of existing industries with the resulting increases in unemployment,5
∂ UO/∂ D<0 and they estimate that ∂ D /∂ z > 0 with ∂
2D/∂ z
2 > 0. That is, faster economic
reforms are believed to result in greater economic displacement, and at an increasing rate.
Here the variable b measures “favorable background conditions” defined such that ∂ D/∂ b
< 0.  Thus, for example, if the opposition believes that economic displacement is more of
a problem for poor, older and rural people, a favorable background condition would be if
the country’s population was relatively rich, young and urban.
The reformers’ problem is to maximize reform speed z (and their forecast of
economic growth) subject to the constraint that the opposition will estimate that the
economic displacement will be too large, that they would be better off with no reform,
and will successfully oppose (coup) the reformists. The problem can be represented in a
simple two period extensive form game as represented in figure 1. In figure 1, the
incumbent reformers have the first move and select a reform speed z recognizing that in
period 2 the opposition will chose to replace the reformers (“coup’) or not (“no coup”).
Payoffs are calibrated so that if there is no reform and no coup each agent has a utility of
zero. It is assumed that if the reformers begin the reform and the opponents decide to
“coup” the result is worse than the “no reform/no coup” result, so that payoffs for each
are less than zero. If the reformers implement reforms (z>0) and there is no coup; then
UR = UR ([E(z)] > 0.
Critical for the solution to the game is the payoff to the opposition if the reformers
implement reforms and the opposition decides not to “coup”.  The utility of the
opposition will be U
nc = UO[E(z*), D(z*,b )] where z* is the speed of the reforms
implemented by the reformers. The opposition will decide “no coup” if U
NC > U
C < 0.
The reformers’ problem is to search for the highest level of reform speed, z, such
that U
NC > U
C. That is, maximize reform speed (and expected economic growth) subject
to maintaining the support of the opposition. This problem is illustrated in figure 2. The
representation of U
NC (the utility of the opposition if there is reform and “no coup”)
reflects the oppositions’ expectations that there are decreasing returns from reform speed
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[∂ E/∂ z > 0 and ∂
2E/∂ z
2 < 0].  It is also assumed that the opposition thinks that faster
economic reforms cause displacement at an increasing rate, [ i.e. that ∂ D /∂ z > 0 and
∂
2D/∂ z
2 > 0.] These assumptions give rise to the shape of U
NC in figure 2. In figure 2 z*
represents the solution of the game for the reformers. Z* is the most rapid economic
reforms possible without inducing the opposition to chose to ‘coup”. Since more
favorable background conditions are defined so that economic displacement is less
(∂ D/∂ b < 0) then more favorable background conditions increase the utility of the
opposition if there is no coup and this allows the reformers to chose faster reform speeds.
Thus given the assumptions of the agents in this model, the observed reform speed will
be a function of the background conditions such that ∂ z*/∂ b > 0. Background conditions
which will lead to more rapid economic reform are those conditions which would reduce
the expected economic displacement of economic reform.
The model developed above assumes that the reformers are the incumbents with
the first mover advantage. It is interesting to compare the results to a model where the so-
called “opposition” is the incumbent. In this model, if the “opposition” had the first move
the chosen reform speed will be slower than in the case where the reformers are the
incumbents. In figure 2, the solution where the opposition has the first move will be
something like Z
~ Thus the prediction is that reform speed will be a function of both
background conditions and the nature of the incumbent decision-makers.
Empirical Specification
The existing discussion of the determination of economic outcomes in
transitioning economies uses the following empirical framework.
(1) Outcomesi = α 0 + α 1(Starting Positions)i + α 2(Reform Speed)i + ε i
U
NC1
b⇑⇑⇑⇑
Z** Z*
UO
    0
  U
C
U
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The economic outcomes in country i are a function of its starting position and reform
speed. Estimates of the parameters α 1 and α 2 are interpreted to tell us something about
the relative magnitude of starting positions and reform speed in determining economic
outcomes.
One example of this approach can be found in the research underlying the World
Bank’s 1996 Development Report, From Plan to Market. de Melo et. al. present the
following empirical results:
(2) AVGR = -9.1 + 2.6CLI - .54PCY -  6.5WAR R
2 = .65
 (5.4)  (4.7)  (1.9)  (4.8)
The estimated results of (2) are based on a sample of 26 CEE and FSU countries and
Mongolia over the period 1989-94. T statistics are in parentheses. The variables are
defined as:
4
AVGR average real GDP growth 1989-94
CLI Cumulative Liberalization Index, an index constructed by
the World Bank to measure the speed of economic reform
PCY 1989 per capita income
WAR dummy variable = 1 if country experienced “War” during
this period
The interpretation offered for the results reported in (2) are that 1989 per capital income
(PCY) measures the countries’ starting position in the sense that it “allow(s) for the
negative effect of more pervasive central planning and over industrialization in the more
highly developed CEE and FSU economies.” But the main conclusion is that controlling
for starting positions and war, reform speed  “has a positive effect on output chances in
the CEE/FSU within the overall context of a ‘transitional recession.’”
5
The game theoretic model developed above suggests an alternative empirical
specification. Since reform speed itself is predicted to be a function of starting positions,
the specification used in (1) will generate biased estimates. Modeling the process so that
reform speed is endogenous suggests that at the bottom of all outcomes lie the starting
positions. Nonetheless we can consider the experiment where two countries with the
same starting positions have random variations in reform speed unrelated to their starting
positions and then measure the degree to which these unexplained variations in reform
speed affect economic outcomes.
The suggested estimation procedure is then a two step process. The first step is to
estimate the reform speed equation in (3).
(3) Reform Speedi = β 0 + β 1(Starting Positions)i + υ i
From the estimates of (3) estimates of υ i , (υ i*), are obtained which are the estimates of
variations in reform speed unrelated to starting positions. This estimate is then used as an
independent variable in the estimation of (4).
                                                
4 Data, variable descriptions, and sources are included in the data appendix.
55 de Melo et. al. page.7.8
(4)  Outcomesi  =  α 0 + α 1(Starting Positions)i + α 2(υ i*) + ε i
Results of Estimation
Table 1 contains the results of estimation of equations (3) and (4). The sample
contains 26 countries from the FSU, Mongolia, and CEE. For the estimation of the
reform speed equation (3), two exogenous variables were used to measure favorable
starting positions; life expectancy at the beginning of the reforms (LE) and the proportion
of the population in agriculture at the start of reforms (%AGR). Life expectancy is meant
to proxy for the general well being of the population. It is generally thought that the
agricultural sector is capable of a quicker response to market reforms than manufacturing
installed under central planning, so countries with high proportions of their population in
the agricultural sector are thought to have a more favorable starting position. A third
variable, REFORMIST is a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if the government was
“reformist” at the onset of reforms and 0 if not. From the theoretical model developed
above, reform speeds will be faster when the first mover is has “reformist” preferences.
To measure whether the initial governments were reformist or not, we make use of
Katratnycky’s Index of Political Freedom and (arbitrarily) classify the ten politically
“freest” countries as having “reformist” governments. In the estimation of equation (3)
REFORM SPEED is measured by the World Bank’s normalized market liberalization
index. The construction of this index by Word Bank researchers to measure the number
of “Poland – equivalent number of reform years”.
6
                                                
6 See De Melo et. al , pages 5,6, and appendix, “The Liberalization Index and How it Was Constructed”.9
Table 1
Dependent Variables
Reform Speed Growth Rate
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -17.84 -100.82 -37.66
(-2.79) (-3.67) (-1.39)
Life Expectancy 0.29 1.39 0.29
(-3.25) -3.61 -0.73
% Agriculture (-.01) -0.01 0.13
(-.38) (-.09) -1.89
Reformist 1.66 - -
(3.87)
Residual Reform -3 . 9 3 -
-4.53
War - -7.97 -5.23
(-4.29) (-3.04)
Reform Speed - - 3.43
-5.53
Number of Observations 26 26 26
Adjusted R
2 0.59 0.63 0.69
t statistics in parentheses.
Estimation of the reform speed equation Results shown in column 1 of Table 1)
supports the hypothesis that reform speed depends on certain starting positions. In
particular, reform speed is faster in countries with higher life expectancies and
“reformist” governments. Reform speed is not significantly related to the proportion of
the labor force in agriculture.
The residual from the estimated reform speed equation, (residual reform speed =
actual reform speed – predicted reform speed), is used as an explanatory variable in the
estimation of (4). Results of this estimation are shown in column 2 of Table 1. In the
estimation of (4) the dependent variable is the average GROWTH RATE in real GDP
1990-97. In addition to the starting positions, (life expectancy and % agriculture) a
dummy variable, War, is included. War equals 1 if the country experienced a war during
this period and zero if not. This variable was constructed by Melo et. al. . Results from
the estimation support the hypotheses that starting positions (especially life expectancy)10
are significant in explaining economic outcomes. Results confirm that war retards
economic growth. Of greater interest here is the effect of economic reform speed on
average economic growth rates. Recall that the estimated reform residual is used since
this residual is unrelated to variables measuring the starting positions. 
7 Thus the
estimated regression coefficient for the independent variable “Residual Reform”
measures the effect of variations in reform speed which are independent of the measured
starting position. This estimated coefficient, 3.93 in Table 1, is large and statistically
significant. The estimated elasticity of economic growth rate with respect to reform
speed, evaluated at variable means, is 1.97.
It’s interesting to question whether the two step estimation approach suggested in
this paper leads to different empirical results that the simpler one step approach suggested
by equation (1). Equation (1) was estimated using this sample, and the results are
presented in the last column of Table 1. Using this empirical approach for this sample
would support the conclusion that starting positions are statistically insignificant. The
large changes in the estimated parameters suggest that the results are sensitive to
specification. Since the results are sensitive to specification, and since theory would
suggest that reform speed is a function of starting positions, then the “two step”
procedure represented by (3) and (4) is the preferred specification.
Concluding Remarks
8
This paper developed a simple game theoretic framework for deriving the result
that the speed of economic reform observed in transitioning economies will be a function
of the position of these countries at the beginning of the reforms. Specifically, starting
positions which reduce the economic displacement resulting from market reforms will
allow policy makers to implement faster reforms. The reforms will also be faster if the
initial incumbent policy makers have reformist preferences. Estimation of the model
supports the idea that reform speed is endogenous and that countries with favorable
starting positions and reformist governments implemented reforms more rapidly.
The existing empirical literature investigating the relative effects of reform speed
and starting positions on economic growth suffer from misspecification. Since reform
speed is a function of starting positions, empirical studies ignoring this relationship in
their specification will have biased estimates. The empirical work presented in this paper
develops an estimate of variations in reform speed which is independent of the measured
starting positions.  Using this measure of variations in reform speed it was found that
both starting positions and reform speed affect economic growth rates. In particular, the
magnitude of increases in reform speed on economic growth rates was large.
Like all studies in this area, this study has its own problems. The number of
observations is necessarily small, some of the variables are measured subjectively, and
theory provides only a suggestion of the types of variables which measure the starting
positions of economies. Critically, the interpretation of υ i* from equation (3) will always
be subject to the criticism that some significant starting position variables have been
omitted from the estimation. Despite these limitations it is still desirable to close the gap
between theoretical and empirical models. The aim of this paper was to provide a simple
                                                
77 The simple correlation coefficients for the estimated reform residual and the variables Life Expectancy
and % Agriculture are approximately zero.11
and theoretically valid alternative to the estimation techniques appearing elsewhere in the
literature.
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Data Appendix
Country Reform Life % Labor Reformist GDP War Reform
Speed Expectancy Agriculture Growth Residual
Slovenia 5.02 73.2 6 1 1.4 0 0.084422087
Poland 5 70.9 27 1 4.1 0 0.891729826
Hungary 4.96 69.3 15 1 -0.2 0 1.221593143
Czech 4.36 72.4 11 1 -0.2 0 -0.305628701
Slovak 4.19 71.2 12 1 -0.6 0 -0.120942528
Bulgaria 3.5 71 13 1 -3.3 0 -0.745387442
Estonia 3.54 69.6 14 1 -3.8 0 -0.292875052
Lithuania 3.29 70 18 1 -7.1 0 -0.627612013
Latvia 2.96 68.8 16 1 -8.5 0 -0.626112445
Romania 2.78 69.8 24 0 -0.3 0 0.626750357
Albania 2.96 72.5 55 0 1.8 0 0.265691347
Russia 2.32 67.2 14 0 -7.7 0 0.841202498
Kyrgyz 2.19 67.9 32 0 -9.5 0 0.647930371
Moldova 1.96 67.7 33 0 -14.1 0 0.483485457
Kazakhstan 1.58 69 22 0 -7.9 0 -0.35740251
Uzbekistan 1.34 69.3 34 0 -2.4 0 -0.591395414
Turkmenistan 0.76 65.8 37 0 -9.6 0 -0.136250004
Croatia 4.81 72.9 16 0 -1 1 1.698613039
Macedonia 4.73 72.1 21 0 -0.8 1 1.888562251
Armenia 1.74 70.5 18 0 -10.3 1 -0.662014615
Georgia 1.59 72.6 26 0 -16.3 1 -1.357358949
Azerbaijan 1.24 69.8 31 0 -15.1 1 -0.859147563
Tajikistan 1.15 68.1 41 0 -16.4 1 -0.38033603
Belarus 1.29 69.8 20 0 -6.1 0 -0.894165117
Ukraine 0.97 69.8 20 0 -13.1 0 -1.214165117
Mongolia 2.74 64.5 32 1 -0.6 0 0.520813125
Reform Speed: This is the “Normalized Liberalization Index” as reported in “From Plan
to Market”, de Melo et al. (World Bank 1996).
Life Expectancy: Life expectancy, in years, 1991-1993, from the World Bank
Development Report, From Plan to Market, (World Bank, 1996), page 172.
% Labor Agriculture: Per cent of labor force in agriculture, 1990, , from the World Bank
Development Report, From Plan to Market, (World Bank, 1996), page 194.
Reformist: Derived from the “Political Freedom Index” in De Melo et al (which in turn
was derived from Karatnycky’s index of political freedom. A dummy variable = 1 if the
Political Freedom index was greater than or equal to 5.0 and 0 if less than 5.00.
GDP Growth: Average growth rate in real GDP 1990-1997. Taken from World Bank web
site data.
War: Variable constructed by De Melo et al to include those countries experiencing
major internal conflicts during 1989-1994. War = 1 if major conflict and 0 if not.
Reform Residual: Calculated from the estimation reported in column (1) of table 1.
Reform Residual = Actual Reform Speed – Predicted Reform Speed.